
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Does Expanding Health Insurance Beyond
Formal-Sector Workers Encourage Informality?
Measuring the Impact of Mexico’s Seguro Popular





Does Expanding Health Insurance Beyond 
Formal-Sector Workers Encourage Informality? 






















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
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Formal-Sector Workers Encourage Informality? 
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Seguro Popular (SP) was introduced in 2002 to provide health insurance to the 50 million 
Mexicans without Social Security. This paper tests whether the program has had unintended 
consequences, distorting workers’ incentives to operate in the informal sector. The analysis 
examines the impact of SP on disaggregated labor market decisions, taking into account that 
program coverage depends not only on the individual’s employment status, but also on that 
of other household members. The identification strategy relies on the variation in SP’s rollout 
across municipalities and time, with the difference-in-difference estimation controlling for 
household fixed effects. The paper finds that SP lowers formality by 0.4-0.7 percentage 
points, with adjustments largely occurring within a few years of the program’s introduction. 
Rather than encouraging exit from the formal sector, SP is associated with a 3.1 percentage 
point reduction (a 20 percent decline) in the inflow of workers into formality. Income effects 
are also apparent, with significantly decreased flows out of unemployment and lower labor 
force participation. The impact is larger for those with less education, in larger households, 
and with somebody else in the household guaranteeing Social Security coverage. However, 
workers pay for part of these benefits with lower wages in the informal sector. 
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1.  Introduction 
The existence of large informal labor markets in developing countries has attracted renewed 
attention because of their connection to poverty, low productivity, and lack of social protection. 
One issue of concern is whether non-contributory programs introduced to address the lack of 
social safety nets for those not in the formal sector are providing perverse incentives for formal 
sector workers (Levy, 2008).
2  Formal sector workers could now avoid having to contribute to the 
formal Social Security program (SS) by moving to the informal sector while receiving (at least 
some) services under the new program.  We propose to test this hypothesis by looking at the effect 
of rolling out Seguro Popular (SP), a non-contributory health program for informal households in 
Mexico from 2000(Q2) to 2009(Q2), using longitudinal data constructed with rotating panels of 
households.   
  This issue is of particular relevance in Mexico, as other work has shown a relatively high 
degree of mobility of workers in Mexico between the formal and informal sectors.  This feature 
has often been raised as evidence that formal and informal sectors are not segmented. Maloney 
and Bosch (2006) show high labor mobility and that entry and separation rates are not 
significantly different across the two sectors.  In addition, the probability of movement between 
sectors does not depend on the age of the worker, which seemingly contradicts the hypothesis that 
informal workers line up to get formal jobs.  Maloney (1999) finds that wages sometimes increase 
and sometimes decrease as a worker moves from one sector to the other, and that the substantial 
flows in both directions persist even in periods of economic expansion. Madrigal and Pagés (2008) 
and Maloney (2004) find that workers value features of informal work such that it should not 
necessarily be taken as an inferior or residual employment option.  What remains a question is 
whether the existence of SP has motivated some households to stop paying into SS to be able to 
qualify for free health insurance.  Or, alternatively, if the availability of SP discouraged workers in 
the informal sector from seeking formal sector jobs covered by SS. 
  The issue of whether the well-intended program to expand health care also delivers 
unintended consequences in the form of disincentives to work for formal firms or to make SS 
contributions has larger implications for the economy.  To the extent that firms in the formal 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we consider ‘formal sector workers’ or ‘formal workers’ those individuals who are registered and 
contributing to Social Security, regardless of the registration or tax status of the enterprise they work for.  Thus, 
workers who are working for a registered firm but who are not themselves contributing to SS are not considered to be 
formal sector workers. 3 
 
sector are more productive and provide the bulk of the tax revenues (both through VATs and SS 
contributions), the decline in the share of workers in the formal sector can reduce aggregate 
productivity and tax revenues.  If the disincentive effects are strong enough, they could also 
jeopardize the sustainability of the social insurance system.  
    There have been efforts to monitor and quantitatively assess the impact of SP.  Some 
papers find very small or no effects (e.g., Azuara and Marinescu, 2011; Barros, 2008; Campos-
Vazquez and Knox, 2008), while Bosch et al. (2010) provides aggregate results that SP may help 
explain a decline in formal sector jobs.  A paper looking at a different health insurance program in 
the Federal District also provides suggestive evidence of an effect on participation and wages 
(Juarez 2008).  This paper addresses some of the data limitations, concerns about omitted 
variables, endogeneity, and institutional features of the SS and SP programs that have not been 
adequately addressed in the existing literature. 
This paper makes five contributions to the existing literature.  First, it exploits the panel 
nature of the data.  The existing papers have either used aggregate data or repeat cross-sections 
that cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity.  Second, we use more disaggregated measures of 
SP.  Existing papers fail to capture the full variability of SP, either looking at state-level or annual 
measures, when the rollout occurred across municipalities within states over time, with 
municipality data available quarterly.  We also confirm that the rollout of the program was not 
endogenous to the level or trends of formality within municipalities.  Third, we take into account 
additional institutional features of SS and SP, i.e., that an individual is covered not only based on 
their own employment status, but also that of their spouse, and in some cases, their parents.  None 
of the existing studies have considered the joint decisions of members within the same household, 
that one member’s participation in the formal sector or contributions to SS extends coverage of SS 
to other household members (spouse and dependents). Fourth, other papers have paid little 
attention to whether the adjustment was a temporary one, i.e., whether there was a level shift in the 
size of the formal sector, whether the rates of transition in and out of the formal sector themselves 
shifted, or whether wages were affected by SP.  Fifth, most papers have focused on the earliest 
rollout periods, when the program covered only a small fraction of the population and found little 
effect of the program.  This paper looks at a longer period, from 2000 to 2009. 
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In this paper, we have data on almost 10 million individuals in rotating panels from 2000 
to 2009.  Individual panel data allows for improved control of individual characteristics and 
assessing whether SP affects labor market dynamics.  It also allows us to test whether different 
subgroups of households or different individuals within the household are more sensitive to SP.  
We can also control for the potential endogeneity of the employment decision based on the 
decisions of others in the household. 
  We find that SP does impact the decisions of workers, generating a moderate increase in 
the share of workers in the informal sector.  Exploiting variation both over time and across 
municipalities, the effects of introducing SP results in a decline in the share of households with SS 
of 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points, depending how time effects are controlled for.  The results indicate 
that much of the adjustment occurs within a few years of the introduction of the program, with the 
effects becoming relatively smaller as the intensity of the program expands. The effect is 
associated with a 3.1 percentage point reduction (a 20 percent decline) in the inflow of workers 
into formality rather than an increase of outflows from formality.  Thus, while the aggregate net 
change in the level of formality is not that large, the proportional change in flows into formality is.   
There is evidence of important income effects, with the introduction of SP associated with 
fewer transitions out of unemployment and lower rates of entry into the labor force.  Our results 
also suggest higher sensitivity in larger households, as well as among households headed by 
persons with less than secondary education completed, particularly if the head is female. They also 
suggest a higher response among individuals who are covered by SS through someone else, or 
among individuals in a household that are not heads, spouses, or dependents of heads.  Finally, our 
results suggest that workers pay for part of the newly acquired SP benefits with lower wages in the 
informal sector.  
2.  Background on Seguro Popular 
México’s Social Security system (SS) only covers about 45 percent of the population, namely, 
formally registered wage workers and their dependents. Self-employed workers are not obliged to 
contribute.   This has left a large share of the population with limited access to health care and no 
access to pensions and other social benefits offered by SS. Moreover, a large share of employees 
in registered firms is not contributing to SS, even though contributions are supposed to be 
mandatory.  5 
 
To address the low coverage of SS, in 2001 the government launched a pilot program, 
Seguro Popular (SP), to improve health care access to all Mexicans not covered by SS.
3 In 2002, 
the program was formally established and reached a total of 295,513 households. By 2007, more 
than 5 million households had access to the program.  The goal is to provide health insurance to 
everybody lacking SS coverage by 2012. The plan provides different schemes of health insurance, 
increases investment in health units (hospitals, clinics), expands distribution of medicines, and 
improves quality of health (including preventative) services.  
SP is financed by the federal and state governments. In principle, beneficiaries would pay 
contributions according to their decile of income, with families included in the lowest two deciles 
exempted from contributions. However in practice, only 2 percent of beneficiaries pay to 
participate in the program (Comisión Nacional de Protection Social y Salud, CNPSS, 2009) 
despite the fact that 65 percent of its beneficiaries are non-poor (Scott, 2006). The only condition 
for eligibility is not to be a beneficiary of SS.  Affiliation of the nuclear family is by household.  
Coverage extends to the spouse or partner of the affiliate, children under 18, or up to 25 if single 
and students or economically dependent and living in same dwelling. In addition, parents of the 
head or spouse 65 or older living in the same house and economically dependent are also covered. 
Other members of the household can also be covered, each one with their own individual 
affiliation.   
SS coverage is also by household. An important difference, however, is that SS only 
covers the spouse and children (up to 16, or up to 25 if disabled or studying) of the affiliate. This 
would suggest that larger households—particularly those where other relatives reside—would see 
SP as relatively more attractive and thus could have a higher probability of dropping or not joining 
SS.   
Another feature of the SP program also helps with the identification strategy; the program 
was launched in 2002, but was rolled out across municipalities over time.  This variation in 
location-time of SP coverage provides a cleaner test than a simple before-after comparison.   
Studies show that there has been significant uptake of the program, although the impact of 
SP on health outcomes is mixed. King et al. (2007) assessed a sample representing 118,569 
                                                 
3 Prior to the creation of Seguro Popular, workers not affiliated to Social Security could obtain health care at either 
public health clinics run by the Secretaria de Salud (SSA) or at private clinics and hospitals.  Public health services 
were few and of low quality. Seguro Popular notably increased the quality and quantity of services provided for the 
uninsured population. 6 
 
households in seven Mexican states, and measured outcomes in a 2005 baseline survey (August 
2005 to September 2005) and follow-up survey 10 months later (July 2006 to August 2006). The 
treatment consisted of encouragement to enroll in a health-insurance program and upgraded 
medical facilities. Participating states also received funds to improve health care facilities and to 
provide medications for services in treated clusters. They estimated intention to treat and complier 
average causal effects non-parametrically. They found that program resources reached the poor. 
However, the program did not show some other expected health effects, possibly due to the short 
duration of treatment (10 months).
4  
Scott (2006) also conducted an impact evaluation of SP using data from 2004 and found 
that there was significant uptake.  However, he finds that the selection of beneficiaries did not 
target the poorest states and households as effectively as its stated objectives.  This raises the 
possibility that the program could indeed be affecting the decision of whether to work in the 
formal or informal sector.  If the program successfully targeted those in the lowest income deciles, 
one might expect more limited impact on formality, as these households are already significantly 
less likely to participate in the formal sector. However, this evidence that non-poor households are 
participating in SP would suggest that it is affecting a portion of the population that might well be 
considering shifts between the formal and informal sectors. 
 
3.  Literature Review 
Several studies have examined the impact on informality of large social programs that may affect 
the incentive workers have to exit formal jobs. This section first explores recent papers measuring 
the effect of SP on labor market outcomes in Mexico. It then discusses relevant papers that 
evaluate the impact of similar programs in other countries. Overall, there is suggestive evidence 
that  SP may discourage formal employment, but data limitations, endogeneity, and omitted 
variables have left room for a more rigorous testing of the hypothesis. 
                                                 
4 Sosa-Rubi et al. (2007) analyzed the cross-sectional 2006 National Health and Nutrition Survey (ENSANUT), 
focusing on the responses of 3,890 women who delivered babies between 2001 and 2006. They found that the SP 
program had a robust, significantly positive impact on access to obstetrical services. 7 
 
  Four established working papers are particularly relevant for our study.  Two found no 
effect of SP on labor market decisions, while two provide suggestive evidence of an effect—albeit 
using aggregate data or data only covering the Federal District. 
Campos-Vazquez and Knox (2008) used aggregate data from 33 urban cities from the 
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENE) during the period 2001-2004.  They did not find any 
effect of SP on the rate of formal employment in the municipality. They also conducted a parallel 
analysis using individual-level data from 136 municipalities during 2002-2004 that also failed to 
find a significant effect. However, their data is only available for individuals from the poorest 
deciles; thus, it captures a segment of society that already has high levels of informality and on 
which it would be less likely that SP would have much effect. Another potential problem is that 
their period of study may be too premature to find any effect at all. 
Parker and Scott (2008) used Rand’s Mexican Family Life Survey 2002-2005 panel.  They 
found a disincentive effect in rural municipalities, with the percentage change relatively large due 
to the small base, i.e. the absolute magnitude of the change is small.  However, they did not find 
comparable effects in the urban areas.  Using aggregate data from the 2000 and 2005 census, they 
did not find significant effects.  This work has only a limited time dimension and again looks at 
the early years of the program. 
Barros (2008) measured the effect of SP on health, consumption, and labor outcomes.  He 
estimated the SP effect by using a triple difference equation, taking differences over time, state 
intensity target (stated objective in 2007 of share of eligible households to enroll), and eligibility 
(whether no one in the household holds a formal sector job).  He assumes that eligibility in a given 
state is not correlated with the state’s target intensity. He uses four repeated cross-sections of the 
national income-expenditure survey ENIGH (2000, 2004, 2005, and 2006), which includes labor 
outcomes and categories of expenditures.  ENIGH data has a total of 76,000 heads of household 
and 156,247 other members.  He did not find a significant result on the probability of being in the 
formal sector, nor did he find an effect on wages.  However, Barros did not control for unobserved 
characteristics as he uses cross section data. The target intensity may also be a poor measure of the 
actual intention to enroll households in SP; these targets are likely to reflect political stances rather 
than an accurate measure of the availability of SP services in an area. 
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Bosch et al. (2010) looked at the effect of SP over a longer time period and did find a 
disincentive effect on formal employment.  They used aggregate data at the municipality level 
from the Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) from 2001 to 2008.  They used a difference-
in-difference approach, comparing the differences in formal jobs outcome in municipalities with 
and without the program. They found evidence of a negative impact of the program on formality at 
late stages of the program (i.e. after 2007) and found that it is larger in small firms compared to 
micro firms (which already have a high level of informality). However, there are limitations to this 
work.  Their data are aggregated at the municipality level, so they cannot control for individual 
heterogeneity or aggregation biases.  
New working papers do use individual level data to look at the impact of SP (Aguilera, 
2011; Azuara and Marinescu, 2011; Duval and Smith 2011).  However, they only use individual 
cross-sectional data; they do not look at how individuals change their employment status over 
time, nor do they control for unobserved heterogeneity.  In addition, they do not take into account 
that individuals’ decisions can be affected by the SS status of their spouse, nor do they consider 
both flows into and out of SS.
5  
One other paper is also pertinent, although it is not focused on SP itself.  Juarez (2008) 
looked at a different program rolled out only in the Federal District to provide universal free health 
insurance in 2001.  She constructed a difference-in-difference approach by comparing results with 
three neighboring states that did not have the program. The paper’s focus is the effect on wages, 
but she used the program as an instrument for participation in the formal sector. Thus, the first 
stage results are relevant here.  Juarez used quarterly individual data from Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo 2000-2004, taking the subsample of unskilled 18-60 years old wage-earning women 
outside of the public sector.  She was able to control for a number of individual and household 
characteristics.  While it is a panel data, she does not use panel estimation techniques.  Rather, she 
pooled the cross sections and clustered the standard errors at the individual level. She found that a 
woman with at most a high school education in the Federal District is 4 to 9.6 percentage points 
less likely to have a formal job after the policy change.  
 
                                                 
5 Duval and Smith (2011) look only at the likelihood of whether informal workers shift from being involuntarily 
informal to voluntarily informal, but used observed household characteristics in making this estimation. Azuara and 
Marinescu (2011) do look at transitions in employment categories, but only over a single quarter. Thus, their results 
would only capture changes that occurred at the precise moment of the rollout.  Otherwise, their results are based on 
differences between individuals in the cross-section.  They also measure SP on an annual rather than a quarterly basis. 9 
 
Because Juarez (2008) is only testing a single district, and the change is over one period, it 
is more difficult to exclude the possibility of another trend in the Federal District contributing to 
the results. Moreover, at least part of the estimated effects could be driven by migration to covered 
areas. However, it is certainly suggestive that these types of effects may be at work in the larger 
SP program. 
Programs such as Seguro Popular have been introduced in Argentina and Colombia and 
evaluated for their effects on formal employment.  The programs do not share all of the same 
features as SP, but they indicate that it is worth evaluating the potential effect they may have on 
incentives to work in the formal sector. 
  Gasparini et al. (2007) assessed the impact of a poverty alleviation program, Programa 
Jefes de Hogar (PJH), on labor informality in Argentina.  The main benefit of the program was a 
conditional cash transfer of 150 pesos per month (below the average market wage for unskilled 
workers) to each eligible individual (unemployed heads of household with dependents under 18 
who are enrolled in school).  Participants were required to perform 20 hours a week of training, 
school, or subsidized work in a private company for six months.  However, it is unclear how much 
these work conditions were enforced. Because the program’s goal was to alleviate poverty, 
beneficiaries included poor families even when the head of household or someone else in the 
household had some labor activity. In addition, as the federal government provided the funds 
while municipalities were responsible for program implementation, local governments had little 
incentive to promote formal jobs and reduce beneficiaries or to enforce requirements strictly.    
The dataset consisted of two short rotating panels from the national household survey 
(Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua –EPHC) covering 70 percent of Argentinean urban 
populations in 28 large urban areas and representing 60 percent of the population. Individuals are 
interviewed in two consecutive rounds, left for two other rounds and followed again in the 
following two quarters (rounds).  The variables of interest are whether a specific individual 
transferred to formal employment in period t to t+1 and whether the individual is a beneficiary of 
PJH in t. The authors employ a difference-in-difference estimation to study whether program 
beneficiaries are more reluctant to seek/accept formal jobs than otherwise equal counterparts, 
particularly when the relative value of the transfer with respect to formal wages declined. They 
found some evidence for an informality bias of the PJH in the period when the value of the 
transfer was relatively high compared to wages in the formal labor market. The effect of the 10 
 
distortion vanished when earnings in registered jobs rose substantially. The results, however, are 
not robust to all the specifications.  
Camacho et al. (2009) measured the effect of a subsidized regime (SR) for health insurance 
for the poor in Colombia on informality.  The period of study is 1992-2005. The SR was designed 
to reach the poor and the unemployed.  It was introduced in 1993, and informality increased steadily 
between 1996 and 2002. The SR is financed with a 1 percent transfer from the contributive regime, 
(CR) paid by formal employers and employers, and with local and central government funds. The 
package is less comprehensive than the CR but, unlike the CR, it covers every member in an 
eligible household regardless of their relationship to the head of household. Coverage for any 
additional family member other than spouse and direct dependents in the CR has an additional 
cost. Thus, there is one additional margin to test for the impact of the program: households with 
larger extended families may be more affected by SR. 
They used the Colombian Household Surveys 1986-2005 (before and after reform). These 
surveys collected data biannually from 1986 to 1996 and annually from 1997 to 2005. The data are 
representative of 10 cities and provides repeat cross-sections.  They found a 2-5 percent increase 
in informality post-SR. The effects of the SR are strongest in households with no vulnerable 
members and attenuated in household with vulnerable members and also in household without 
potential extended beneficiaries.  They also estimated their results in a panel of poor individuals 
matched twice with similar results.  
Identification of the effects of SR comes from time variation across cities as to when a 
means test of eligibility for SR was implemented.  In their panel estimates, the variation is also 
across eligibility to SR. However, with their data (biannual data for household surveys or two 
waves for the panel of poor individuals), it appears that there is only one round of data difference 
in the introduction of the program across cities.  Thus, most of the identification comes from pre 
and post comparisons.  This makes the results particularly susceptible to being influenced by other 
changes affecting labor markets that were occurring at the same time. For example, a broader 
package of labor market reforms was introduced to make labor markets more flexible, and there 
were external shocks that affected labor demand.  The simultaneity of these changes makes it 
difficult to ascribe all of the effects to the SR program.   
The studies reviewed on issue both in Mexico and outside of Mexico suggest that social 
programs that put incentives on informal work can have an effect on the level of informality.  11 
 
However, the papers are not conclusive and there is room to improve the measurement of the 
effects. The next section describes the data and the identification strategy proposed for this task. 
4.  Expected Effects of SP  
Seguro Popular provides health benefits to households provided that the individuals are not in 
formal jobs or covered by SS through someone else in the household. In that regard, the 
introduction of SP can affect various margins: 
1.  Participating/not participating.  As households spend considerable resources on health care, 
any benefit that reduces the costs of health care goods and services is tantamount to an 
increase in income. It is therefore expected that if this effect is important, some workers may 
reduce their labor supply. Also, transitions out of inactivity may decline.  
2.  Unemployment/not participating.  Workers who were previously searching for a job may stop 
searching or search less intensively when the benefit is made available.  
3.  Formal/informal jobs. In an integrated labor market, that is, in a market where workers have 
formal and informal jobs available and wages are determined such that workers are indifferent 
between formal and informal jobs, the possibility of getting SP free of charge makes informal 
jobs more attractive.  It is therefore expected that the following will occur: first, some workers 
will leave the formal sector to take jobs in the informal sector. Second, the number of workers 
who would have normally transited from informal to formal jobs declines, and third,  wages in 
formal sector adjust upwards relative to wages in the informal sector to compensate for the 
greater difficulty in attracting workers in the formal sector.  
All in all, these effects imply that the introduction of SP is expected to be associated with a 
decline in the supply of labor, a reduction in the outflow from unemployment, an increase in the 
share of workers in the informal sector, and a rise in the wages of formal workers relative to wages 
of informal workers. Notice, however, that the ratio of total informal workers to the population 
may increase or decrease depending on whether changes in participation dominate the formal or 
the informal employment margin.  The effects described will be more prevalent the more 
integrated are the formal and informal sectors of the labor market. In particular, in a totally 12 
 
segmented labor market, that is, one in which informal workers are lining up to get formal sector 
jobs, the introduction of SP may not be sufficient to make informal jobs as attractive as formal 
ones. In that event, the introduction of SP should not affect the incentives to become informal, 
although it may still entail income effects, which affect the participation/non-participation and the 
unemployment/non-participation decisions of individuals and households.  
5. Data 
This study uses quarterly data from the National Employment Survey Encuesta Nacional de 
Ocupación y Empleo of Mexico, a rotating panel of households. There are two periods of 
implementation (ENE: 2000-2004) and (ENOE: 2005-2009). It is nationally representative but, 
strictly speaking, the ENE survey had an adequate frame only for the urban population. The data 
includes a rotating panel at the individual and household level (2000-2009).
6  
The data cover almost 10 million individuals from 2000 (Q2) to 2009 (Q2) between 15 and 
65 years of age
7 in 291 municipalities across the country.
8 We observe whether a specific 
individual changes SS status (provided by formal employment) over consecutive periods. We also 
observe whether the individual is covered by SS through the spouse or directly through his or her 
job. At the household level we have an average of 100,000 households per period. Figure 1a 
shows the quarterly trend of the share of individuals and households covered by SS. Formality 
exhibits more of an upward trend after the first quarter of 2005.  Figure 1b shows the trends of the 
shares of population by their labor market status. There is a drop in the share of wage earners 
without SS and other informal employment at around the fourth quarter of 2004, but for the most 
part the shares are stable.   
                                                 
6 Three-fifths of individuals at the end of 2004 roll over to ENOE in 2005. However, in view of some methodological 
changes implemented to the ENOE relative to the ENE which could affect observations overlapping the two panels, 
we chose to discontinue rollover of individuals into 2005. In our estimates, differences in methodology across the two 
datasets are accounted for with either a survey dummy or with household fixed effects. 
7 About 370,000 individuals per quarter. 
8 Mexico had 2,456 municipalities in 2009, and the data covers 1,272. However, we eliminated municipalities that: 1) 
do not have at least 50 observations once; 2) do not have at least 30 observations which appear in at least four 




To measure SP we use the household registry of each entity with records on date of each 
household membership and location. We match the number of households registered in SP by 
municipality and quarter obtained from the administrative data with the panel data. Figure 2 shows 
the trend in the number of households and individuals with SP. 
 
Figure 3 shows the share of municipalities that have rolled out SP using different thresholds (at 
least five households, 2 percent and 5 percent of the population in the municipality covered). The 
program was first deployed in a few municipalities by 2002, and its coverage has steadily 



















2000q1 2001q1 2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1 2009q1
date
share individual with ss share household ss covered
source: Labor Surveys















2000q1 2001q3 2003q1 2004q3 2006q1 2007q3 2009q1
date
wage-employed with ss self-employed
wage-employed  without ss not in labor force
other informal employment
source: Labor Surveys



















2002q3 2003q3 2004q3 2005q3 2006q3 2007q3 2008q3
date
individuals with SP (millions) households with SP (millions)
Source: Seguro Popular Registry for municipalities in Labor Surveys
Figure 2. Number of Individuals and Households with Seguro Popular14 
 
enrolled, and in 40 percent of the municipalities coverage was above 2 percent of the population. 




Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables in the analysis. On average, 45 percent 
of the households are covered and 27 of the individuals are directly affiliated to SS.  Most 
households have at least six people (61 percent). Regarding the proportion of people in different 
labor market states, in addition to the 27 percent in salaried formal jobs, 18 percent of the 
population is in salaried jobs without SS, and another 14 percent are self-employed, 2 percent are 
unemployed, and 4 percent are in other informal jobs. Thirty-eight percent of the population is out 
of the labor force.  
6. Identification Strategy 
The analysis will examine the impact of SP on the probability of a household being covered by SS 
by estimating the following specification. 
 

















2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1 2009q1
date
5 households with SP 2% population with SP
5% population with SP
Source: Seguro Popular Registry for municipalities in Labor Surveys
Figure 3. Share of Municipalities with Seguro Popular15 
 
where i identifies the household, j the municipality, and t the period, SS takes the value of 1 if the 
head of household or the spouse of the head are contributing to SS through their job, Zt is a vector 
of time dependent variables, and Xijt is a vector of household characteristics that vary over time.  
Finally, SPjt is defined as a dummy that takes a value of 1 in municipalities and periods in which 
the number of affiliates to the program is positive.  
Panel data enables us to control for unobserved time invariant characteristics of the unit 
making the employment decisions (household).  Thus, the average SP effect is given by   and is 
estimated by comparing the differences in the probability of formality of households before and 
after SP is rolled out across municipalities with and without SP. 
The identification strategy relies on the variation of SP rollout across municipalities and 
time. The difference-in-difference estimation controls for other municipality and time effects. The 
program was rolled out across the 32 states in Mexico over four years. Within states, coverage of 
municipalities was also rolled out over time (up to eight years).  If   is negative when looking at 
the probability of formal employment, this would be consistent with SP having the incentive of 
encouraging informality. 
Our identification strategy could fail if the rollout pattern of SP coincides with other 
shocks affecting labor markets. Having multiple locations and multiple years mitigates this 
concern, although it cannot strictly rule it out. To minimize this problem, we control for macro 
level variables (quarterly GDP and inflation, or alternatively with quarter dummies). We also 
allow for state-specific time trends to capture the important heterogeneity of the Mexican 
economy.    
The analysis also assesses the degree of sensitivity of results to the use of cross-sectional 
estimation by means of the following specification: 
 
P(SSijt) =j + α Mt + µRit +λZt +  SPjt +ψXijt + ijt  , where E[ijt\jt]=0     (2) 
 
where  j denotes a set of municipality dummies, Mt  is a dummy that identifies whether an 
observation is part of the first or the second panel of data, and Rit is a vector of individual 
characteristics of the household head.   
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    An adult can get SS through his or her formal job, through his or her spouse’s job or 
through parents if he or she is a dependent.
9 The decision of a spouse to change sectors based on 
SS status is likely to be taken at the household level.  If it is a joint decision, ignoring the spouse’s 
decision is an omitted variable; but including it introduces endogeneity. We address this potential 
concern by estimating the model at the household level. This abstracts from whether one or more 
members in the household switch between formal and informal jobs to look at the status of the 
household as a whole.  It limits the effects to those switches that affect the household’s source of 
health insurance. 
An important concern is that the rollout of SP could be correlated with informality trends 
in municipalities. This would affect our estimates because the error term would be correlated with 
our estimate of interest.  The results presented in Table 2, however, indicate that there is little 
correlation between the share of formality in a given period and municipality and the probability 
that that municipality receives SP in the following period.   
The probability of SP being rolled out is measured with a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 when a municipality shows at least one affiliate in the SP registry, and zero otherwise.  
This is true whether the share of formality is lagged one or two years (Columns (1) – (4)).  The 
rate of change of formality (measured as a percentage of households or of individuals in SS) in a 
municipality is likewise uncorrelated with the timing of SP’s rollout (Columns (5) and (6)). These 
results limit concerns of the possible endogeneity of the deployment of SP across municipalities.
10  
  Social Security and SP are not perfect substitutes. Contributing to SS also gives rights to 
pension and job security benefits. SP only provides for health benefits, which in principle are 
lower than those granted by SS.  However, as previously mentioned, and unlike SS, SP provides 
benefits for all members of the household.  Importantly, SP is also free. Therefore, the household’s 
decision to choose between SP and SS could also be a function of wealth (richer people may opt 
for private health care even if SS or SP is available), the expectations of wages in each sector 
(formal and informal), and household characteristics, such as age, household size, and number of 
dependents (i.e., having more dependents may increase the need for medical coverage for 
extended members of the family, as well as increase the willingness to forgo a pension because of 
                                                 
9 In Mexico, SS through a formal job covers spouse, parents living in household, and children up to 15, or up to 26 if a 
student or disabled and living in the same  house.   
10  There was some discussion among policymakers of targeting the rollout to more populous states first.  There is 
some evidence of this, but controlling for various state and municipality characteristics rather than including 
municipality fixed effects, the correlation with the size of the formal sector remains insignificant. 17 
 
higher expectations of being taken care of in older age; also, younger individuals may care less 
about pensions.
11)  Later in the paper, we discuss whether the effects of the introduction of SP 
have been different across different types of households.  
Households vary in their underlying probability of having someone making SS 
contributions and thus providing SS coverage. For this table, the household is considered to be 
covered if either the head or the spouse of the head is making contributions to SS.  Table 3 
presents the average incidence of SS coverage across household types, averaged across time. As 
expected, households headed by people with lower levels of formal education (less than secondary 
schooling completed) are much less likely to be covered by SS than households headed by 
individuals with higher educational attainment. This is particularly true for female-headed 
households with less than secondary school completed. In contrast, smaller and larger households 
have similar rates of coverage.  
 
7.  Results  
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the effect of the rollout of SP in a given municipality on 
the probability that a household in that municipality is covered by SS, based on models (1) and 
(2). Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the cross-sectional model, controlling for the 
characteristics of the household head (gender, age, education) as well as household composition 
characteristics, such as the number of children 5 years old or younger, the number of children 
between 6 and 13 years old, the number of individuals in the household that are older than 64, and 
municipality fixed effects. In addition, to control for macro variables and other time-varying 
effects, it includes quarterly national GDP, quarterly national inflation rates, and state-specific 
trends.  All specifications are clustered at the municipality level (Bertrand et al., 2004). The first 
column uses all the individuals in each household, while the second column uses only one 
observation per household.  
  The results strongly suggest a moderately negative effect on informality when SP is 
deployed in a given municipality. The results are very similar across the two columns, indicating 
that the introduction of SP increases informality by about 0.7 percentage points, which amounts to 
an additional 1.5 percent of the baseline level.   
                                                 
11 Juarez, L. (2008). 18 
 
We next assess the robustness of our results to the introduction of  random and individual 
fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4, respectively), making full use of the longitudinal nature of the 
data. This identification strategy is very demanding, as it is based on a comparison of the change 
in the probability of being formal of a given household around the introduction of SP in a given 
municipality. Because we can follow households during at most five quarters, our windows of 
observation around given thresholds are small. The advantage of this methodology is that it 
ensures that we compare the same households over time and therefore that the results are not due 
to composition effects resulting from aggregating different households over time—or due to the 
migration of individuals with a higher probability of being informal toward locations with SP.  
This aspect is particularly important because household surveys in Mexico are not designed to be 
representative at the municipality level. This implies that cross-sectional estimates may suffer 
from aggregation at the municipality level of non-representative averages over time. This problem 
is avoided with fixed effects estimates, as they are based on comparing the behavior of given 
households over time.  Given their superior possibilities to control for unobservables and make 
good use of existing data, most of our results are inferred from estimates that take full advantage 
of the longitudinal nature of the survey.  
The results for the random and fixed effects models yield very similar coefficients and in 
both cases about half the ones obtained in the cross-sectional model. Thus, the coefficient of SP is 
negative and statistically significant and it indicates a magnitude of the impact of 0.4 percentage 
points.  Nonetheless, the Hausmann test rejects the null hypothesis of equality between random 
and fixed effects. We therefore only estimate fixed effect models in the remainder of the paper.  
  We next assess the robustness of our basic results to changes in the specification. Column 
(1) in Table 5 reports the results of excluding state trends from the FE specification. This yields an 
impact of SP that is twice as large if included and similar in size to the one obtained with cross-
sectional estimates.  Column (2) in Table 5 is identical to Column (4) Table 4 and is provided only 
for comparison. Column (3) reports the estimates when instead of controlling for business cycle 
and other macro variables with quarterly Log of GDP and inflation, quarterly time dummies are 
included. In that case, the size of the coefficient is further reduced and it is no longer significant.  
Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that SP has no effect, although this specification 
maybe too demanding, as it does not use most of the variation of the data.  
 19 
 
One possible source of concern is whether our estimates are driven by the launching of a 
non-contributory pension program during the period of study in the municipality of Mexico City. 
To the extent that individuals can obtain pensions if informal, informality could have become 
more attractive due to this program rather than SP.  We re-estimate our basic results presented in 
Column 2, (i.e. including state-specific trends) excluding Mexico City from the sample (Col 4), 
and the results remain unchanged. We also re-estimate our results excluding the last quarter of 
2004, a period in which the survey instrument changed and the sample size of the survey was 
reduced (Col 5) and again find no change in the results.  
Finally, to take into account the extensive margin and the fact that the effects may intensify 
as the number of affiliates increases, we also estimate a quadratic specification with the Log and 
the Log square of the number of affiliates with our basic macro controls (state trends, Log GDP 
and inflation). The results are reported in Column 6. The quadratic specification suggests an effect 
which increases over time until it peaks, only to decline somewhat afterwards. It indicates that on 
average an increase in the number of affiliates of 10 percent leads to a decrease in 0.012 
percentage points in formality.  At the same time, the number of people in SP began at low levels 
such that the percentage increase in those affiliated with SP has risen tremendously over time. 
 
Distance to SP roll out  
To further assess the effects overtime of the introduction of the program, we estimate a third 
specification, which includes a full set of indicator variables that capture the distance to the quarter 
of deployment of the program in a given municipality—defined as the quarter in which the 
number of SP affiliates changes from zero to a positive number,—that is: 
 
P(SSijt) = i+ λZt + ∑     
 
      DjψXijt + εijt  , where E[εijt\jt]=0   

where Djdenotes an indicator which takes the value of 1, quarters after deployment of SP in 
municipality j and where denotes number of quarters before the starting time of the program. 
We also estimate a cross section version of this estimation, in which instead of household fixed 
effects we control for municipality fixed effects, household type dummies, and an indicator of 
whether the data belongs to the first or the second panel of the data. 
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    The results, summarized in figures 4a and 4b, suggest that the deployment of SP brings 
about a negative impact on formality which would become smaller over time.  According to the 
cross-sectional estimates, effects would pick six to eight quarters after the introduction of the 
program, while in the FE estimation, effects would pick three quarters after deployment. After a 
few periods, the effects appear to be no longer significant; however, this may be related to the still 
short life of the program: only a relatively small fraction of households had access to the program 
for more than two years during the time span of our data. 
Figure 4: Impact of Seguro Popular on Formality over Time: 
 Regression Coefficients and 10% Confidence Intervals.   
Figure 4a: Cross Section Estimation  Figure 4b: Panel Estimation (Fixed Effects) 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates from SP registry and household surveys.  
Intra-household dynamics 
We next explore if, within households, individuals have different incentives to become informal 
given the availability of SP depending on their position in the household. These different 
dynamics could arise, for example, because coverage of SS is extended to eligible dependents of a 
contributor. Given the current design of SS, eligible dependents of a contributor who also 
contribute obtain exactly the same benefits as if they did not.  Therefore, SS offers few incentives 
to contribute as a second earner. The availability of SP may make switching to informality more 
attractive for a second earner if the switcher and her family can get coverage by SP in addition to 
coverage by SS, thus maximizing access to different means of protection. In some municipalities, 

















convenient for families to have both and chose depending on needs. Another benefit of SP is that 
it extends health insurance coverage to other members of the household, such as elderly relatives, 
not covered in SS. While in principle, the rules of the program state that coverage to SP requires 
not being affiliated to SS, it is unclear whether this condition is enforced in practice.   
To assess this, in Table 6 we re-estimate specification (1) at the individual level 
distinguishing by the relative position that a person occupies within a household, that is, head, 
spouse of head, son or daughter of head, and other relatives of head. All estimations include 
individual fixed effects. Column (1) reports results for all individuals in the sample. Noticeably, 
the coefficient indicates an effect of SP on informality of 0.6 percentage points, almost twice the 
size of the effect estimated at the household level.  This difference suggests that intra-household 
dynamics are important, but some transitions at the individual level do not translate into changes 
in household status on whether they are covered or not covered by SS.  Column (2) focuses on 
results for household heads. This coefficient is similar in size to the one estimated at the household 
level, which suggests that non-heads are more sensitive to SP.   
The results presented in Columns (3) - (6) are consistent with this hypothesis. Spouses are 
estimated to be more sensitive to the introduction of SP than heads of household (Column 3), 
particularly if married to or cohabitating with a head of household who is contributing to SS 
(Column 4). We confirm that the differences in coefficients provided in Columns (3) and (4) are 
statistically significant (Column 5). This would be consistent with SP and SS not being perfect 
substitutes, but operating as complementary programs in practice for some families.  Household 
members who are neither heads nor dependents show an even higher level of sensitivity, about 
five times larger than the effects for heads of household (Column 6). In contrast, household 
members covered by SS by their parents exhibit a low degree of sensitivity to SP (Column 7), 
consistent with the finding discussed below that younger people and those with fewer dependents 
are less sensitive to the introduction of SP. We also confirm that there are no important differences 
in response to SP among household heads, if they are single with no dependents (Column 8). 
One problem that may arise in these estimates is that the SS contribution status of other 
members of the household may be endogenous to an individual’s own status if the members of a 
household make decisions jointly. This might particularly be the case in the regressions for 
spouses, since their decisions are likely to be made simultaneously with heads of household.  To 
address this concern, we re-estimate the results presented in Column (5) by instrumental variables. 22 
 
The SS status of the head is predicted with the set of variables included in specification (2), and 
the interaction between SP and the SS status of the head is predicted with interactions between the 
variables included in specification (2) and SP. The results of this IV approach are presented in 
Column (9) of Table 6. Results suggest that the status of the head regarding SS is a very important 
predictor of the spouse’s status. In addition, our results confirm that for spouses of heads of 
household who contribute to SS, the introduction of SP acts as an important disincentive for the 
spouse to contribute.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that different individuals have markedly different incentives 
to switch to SP depending on their household situation.  Heads of household, whether single or 
married, are not easily swayed to move to informality by the availability of lower quality, but free 
of charge, health insurance. In contrast, spouses of heads are more likely to switch, particularly if 
the head is already contributing to SS. We also find evidence that people other than heads of 
household, spouses of heads, or dependents of heads (such as older parents, relatives, cousins, 
etc.) have a higher probability of ceasing to contribute to SS after the rollout of SP than heads of 
household, their dependents or their spouses.   
 
Labor flows 
A number of studies have documented the high dynamism of the Mexican labor market, in terms 
of experiencing large flows in and out of the formal sector and also in and out of the labor market 
(Maloney, 1999; Pagés and Stampini, 2009).  
In such a context, an important question is whether the introduction of SP leads to a change 
in labor market dynamics, and in particular, whether the increase in informal employment 
associated with the introduction of SP is related to larger inflows into informality (and out of 
formal jobs) and/or smaller outflows out of informality.  
 
We address this question estimating the following specification at the individual level: 
 
LMijt = λZt + LMijt-1+  SPjt + LMijst-1* SPjt +ψXijt + SS_covijt + 
+ SPjt*SS_covijt + εijt     where E[εijt\jt]=0                                                                                      (4)
   23 
 
that is, we assess how the probability of individual i, of being in a given labor market status, in 
municipality j at time t (LMijt), is affected by SP, conditional on its past labor market status. We 
consider six possible labor market states: salaried employment with SS, salaried without SS, out of 
labor force, unemployed, self-employed and other types of informal employment such as unpaid 
family work. We also control for whether the individual has access to SS through someone else in 
the household (SS_covijt) and for the interaction of this variable with SP. We estimate each 
equation for each labor market status separately; there are no efficiency gains from estimating the 
model jointly because the set of regressors are the same across equations.  
The results are presented in Table 7. Column (1) shows a decline in flows from informal 
salaried to formal salaried employment with the introduction of SP.
12 The magnitude of the change 
in flow is substantial, 3.1 percentage points (on a base of 15 percent, so a reduction of 20 percent). 
We also see a small reduction in transitions from self-employment to formal sector jobs (0.2 
percentage points), a sizeable reduction in the transitions from inactivity to formal salaried 
employment (1.1 percentage points), and an even larger decline in flows from unemployment to 
formal salaried jobs. These results provide evidence that SP lowers the incentives of moving to 
formal wage employment from informal jobs, inactivity or unemployment. 
  In turn, Columns (2), (3) and (4) assess whether SP affects inflows into the informal sector. 
We find evidence of a very small increase in the inflow to salaried informal jobs out of formal 
employment (0.5 percentage points) and no evidence of an increase in the inflow to self-
employment or other informal jobs out of formal salaried jobs as a consequence of SP rollout.  So, 
while it may be argued that SP makes informal jobs more attractive, such a change has not been 
sufficient to persuade a large share of formal workers to switch into informality. 
There are also some noteworthy effects on the transitions to inactivity (Column 5). The 
rollout of SP is associated with an increase in the inflows to inactivity from formal salaried 
employment (0.5 percentage points). The increase in inflows to inactivity is particularly evident 
among self-employed workers (2.3 p.p.) and workers in other informal jobs (1.8 p.p.).  In addition, 
SP is associated with an increase in the share of workers who remain in inactivity one period after 
(1 p.p.). We also find an increase in the persistence of unemployment and a decline in all 
                                                 
12 Calculated as the difference between the coefficient on SP*Wage employed without SS and the coefficient on SP, 
i.e. 0.084-0.053=0.031.    24 
 
unemployment outflows as a result of the SP, suggesting that it reduces workers’ incentives to get 
out of unemployment and into jobs. 
All in all, the evidence indicates that the reduction in formality has more to do with a 
decline of transitions into formality than an increase in the outflow from formality. This is 
consistent with SP having reduced the incentives of workers to actively search for formal jobs, 
while not providing incentives strong enough to dissuade many formal workers to switch into 
informality. The results also suggest that SP is associated with some significant income effects, 
reducing the incentives of people to be employed or actively search for jobs.  
 
Effects across types of households  
As indicated before, SP and SS are not direct substitutes. While SS offers a better health care 
package, and some additional benefits (most notably access to post-retirement income in the form 
of a pension, whose amount varies depending on the number of contributions), SS requires 
contributing a fairly large share of income to the program. Instead, SP offers only health benefits, 
but it is free of charge and covers more members of a household. Given these characteristics, it is 
expected that the introduction of SP would reduce incentives to participate in SS differently across 
types of households, depending on income, size of the household, or other characteristics.  In order 
to test this prediction, we run our basic estimates at the household level for different types of 
households.  The results are presented in Table 8. 
When separating according the education and gender of the head of household, we find the 
effects to be more important for households headed by individuals with lower levels of education, 
and this is true both for male- and female-headed households. As in Juarez (2008), we find the 
effects to be larger for less educated women than for males. 
By age, the effect of SP is measured to be lower across households headed by younger and 
older people and stronger for those headed by middle-aged people. The lower reaction of older 
workers is not surprising considering that older workers place greater value on pensions, which are 
only provided in the formal sector. In addition, they consume more health care and are therefore 
more likely to give greater weight to the quality of the package. For their part, younger workers 
tend to be healthier and less concerned overall with health insurance of any kind.   
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The evidence also indicates that larger households react quite differently to the 
introduction of SP than smaller ones. For households of more than five members, the introduction 
of SP reduces the probability of formality while the effect is not apparent for smaller households, 
which confirms that SP is more valuable to households in which the program allows the extension 
of coverage to more members. 
 
Effects on Wages 
Lastly, we explore whether wages adjust to the introduction of SP. Using the subsample of people 
who remain in paid employment from one quarter to the next, we estimate the following 
specification:  
 
logwijt=SPjt+IFD_IFijt+FID_FIijt+IID_IIijt+IFSPjt*D_IFijt+FISPjt*D_FIijt+IISPjt*D_IIijt+ijt   (5)
 
Where logwijt denotes the log difference of wages from period t-1 to period t;  D_MKijt denotes a 
set of dummies indicating the transit from state M in t-1 to state K in quarter t, and where the 
states possible are: salaried with SS, F and working in the informal sector, I (salaried informal, 
self-employed, other informal) and the possible transitions are four: FF, FI, IF and II. This 
specification assesses the wage gains or losses associated with changing states and whether those 
gains or losses have been on average modified by the introduction of SP.  
The results are reported in Table 9. Focusing first on wage gains or losses prior to the 
introduction of SP, we measure that relative to the omitted transition (remaining in the formal 
sector), transiting from an informal to a formal job is associated with a further 1.5 percentage point 
(10 percent) increase in wages, while transiting from a formal to an informal job is associated with 
a 1.4 percentage point decline. In contrast, remaining in the informal sector leads to a minor wage 
decline of 0.2 percentage point relative to remaining in the formal sector.  
  As discussed, in an integrated labor market the introduction of SP should have led to a 
decline in wages in informal jobs and an increase of wages in formal jobs to compensate for an 
increase in fringe benefits in the informal sector. The interaction with SP is only statistically 
significant for those who remain in the informal sector and suggest a wage decline relative to those 
who remain in a formal job. This is consistent with the transition results: SP discouraged some 
people from exiting from the informal sector and transiting to formal jobs, remaining instead in 26 
 
the informal sector. In turn, wages in the informal sector declined somewhat relative to those in 
the formal sector. 
All in all, the results indicate that the introduction of SP encouraged a moderate increase 
in informality, which increased faster as the program got better known and then declined 
somewhat. At the individual level, the effects mostly came from reduced flows into formal jobs, 
rather than through higher outflows from formality.  These effects are more pronounced for 
individuals who are covered by SS through someone else in the household or are not heads, 
spouses of heads, or dependents of heads.  At the household level, households headed by low 
skilled heads of household (particularly if female) or large households show a higher propensity to 
stop contributing to SS with the introduction of SP.    
The results also suggest that informal workers paid partly for this benefit through a 
moderate reduction in their wages relative to those of formal workers.  
Finally, our estimates also reveal that the provision of SP discouraged some workers from 
participating in the labor market and from actively searching for jobs.  Such effects are given by 
the reduction of outflows from inactivity, and also by an increase in inflows to inactivity, 
particularly from some types of informal sector jobs.  They are also noticeable in the reduction of 
unemployment outflows to all types of jobs.  
 
8. Conclusions 
The question of whether social protection programs distort incentives to encourage workers to be 
in the informal sector is of considerable interest to current policy makers.  There is a worthy 
commitment to provide expanded health care coverage, but a concern not to provide disincentives 
to work in the formal sector.  Providing evidence on the extent to which such incentives appear to 
be operating is an important contribution.  Other papers looking at this question have provided 
mixed results.  Our results, controlling for decisions at the household level—given that coverage 
in SS varies at the household level
13 –and for unobserved household heterogeneity provide the 
best test of whether such effects appear important. We find significant and robust evidence that 
such disincentives are at play, and that they are stronger in larger households, in households with 
less education, and for workers who are covered by SS through someone else.  The magnitude of 
                                                 
13 Strictly for the spouses and their dependent children. 27 
 
the effects is on the order of 0.4-0.7 percentage points decline in the size of the formal sector, with 
much of the adjustment happening upfront (over the initial two years). Rather than formal workers 
moving into formality, such effects are driven by a reduction of flows out of the informal sector 
into formal jobs.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Households
Covered by Social Security 3,230,194 0.45 0.50 0 1
Number of children 0-5  3,235,495 0.48 0.73 0 11
Number of children 6-13  3,235,495 0.71 0.92 0 10
Number of adults 66 or older  3,235,495 0.08 0.35 0 18
large household (more than 5) 3,235,495 0.61 0.49 0 1
Individuals
Social Security 9,900,477 0.27 0.44 0 1
Male 9,912,656 0.47 0.50 0 1
Age 9,912,656 33.34 13.76 14 65
Education: secondary or more  9,912,020 0.15 0.35 0 1
Wage-employed with social security 9,912,656 0.27 0.44 0 1
Wage-employed without social security 9,912,656 0.18 0.38 0 1
Self-employed 9,912,656 0.14 0.34 0 1
Other informal employment 9,912,656 0.04 0.19 0 1
Not in the labor market 9,912,656 0.38 0.49 0 1
Unemployed 9,912,656 0.02 0.14 0 1
Working in small firm 1-5 employees  8,230,081 0.24 0.42 0 1
Working in medium firm 6-50 employees  8,230,081 0.15 0.35 0 1
Working in large firm more than 50 employees  8,230,081 0.26 0.44 0 1




Table 2. Rollout of Seguro Popular 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Municipality and period
Dependent Variable SP SP SP SP SP SP
Share ss coverage (%HH) 1 year lagged -0.01536
[0.11415]
share ss (%individuals) 1 year lagged -0.00188
[0.17790]
Share ss coverage (%HH) 2 years lagged 0.01189
[0.12975]
Share ss (%individuals) 2 years lagged 0.01721
[0.21118]
Growth of share ss coverage (%HH)- 2 years 0.00004
[0.00003]
Growth of share ss (%individuals)- 2 years 0.00005
[0.00006]
quarter time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.58189 0.57710 0.56429 0.56463 0.56816 0.56820
[0.04552]**0.04432]**0.05104]**0.05181]**[0.02431]*** [0.02431]***
Observations 8740 8740 7576 7576 7524 7524
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Author's calculations based on Seguro Popular Registry for dependent variable and on Mexico Labour Surveys  33 
 
Table 3: Percent of Households Covered by Social Security
Household head (HH) with less than secondary education completed 40%
HH with secondary completed or more education 55%
HH male with less than secondary education completed 40%
HH female with less than secondary education completed 36%
HH  <30 years old 52%
HH 30-49 years old 51%
HH 50-65 years old 29%
Large Household (>=5 individuals) 45%




Table 4. Impact of Seguro Popular on Formality
1: No-Panel versus Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cross-Section Cross-Section 





Household       
Fixed Effects
2
SP -0.00670 -0.00724 -0.00367 -0.00358
[0.00315]** [0.00326]** [0.00144]** [0.00136]***
Male head 0.13200 0.12969 0.13182
[0.00397]*** [0.00378]*** [0.00402]***
Age of head -0.00570 -0.00512 -0.00525
[0.00033]*** [0.00034]*** [0.00033]***
head with primary 0.08876 0.09258 0.08357
[0.00313]*** [0.00323]*** [0.00279]***
head with less than secondary 0.21814 0.22236 0.20210
[0.00596]*** [0.00626]*** [0.00560]***
head with secondary 0.24393 0.24055 0.23033
[0.00793]*** [0.00818]*** [0.00755]***
head with terciary 0.35490 0.35925 0.33781
[0.01156]*** [0.01142]*** [0.01054]***
N.children 0-5 -0.00984 -0.00628 -0.00327 0.00228
[0.00104]*** [0.00125]*** [0.00085]*** [0.00088]***
N. children 6-13 0.00261 0.00525 0.00290 0.00157
[0 .00096]*** [0.00104]*** [0.00078]*** [0.00085]*
N. elderly +66 -0.01313 -0.00157 -0.01051 -0.00860
[0.00129]*** [0.00209]*** [0.00073]*** [0.00071]***
Municipality dummy yes yes yes no
Survey dummy yes yes yes no
Controls yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.27522 0.40307 0.42945 0.43052
[0.08990]*** [0.11014]*** [0.05168]*** [0.05002]***
Observations 3230029 926827 3230029 3230194
R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.0010 0.0008
Number of id_i 929339 929364
1 Household level: A formal household is one that is covered by Social Security either by the job 
of the household head or spouse of head.
Controls include:  quarterly log GDP, quarterly inflation, and a state trend
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FE will be used in the rest of the analysis.
2 Hausman test for H0:  "difference in coefficients -fixed effects (FE) versus random effects- not systematic" 




Table 5. Impact of Seguro Popular on Formality
1:  Extensions. Fixed Effects Estimation





SP -0.00654 -0.00358 -0.00084 -0.00378 -0.00376





n.children 0-5 0.00264 0.00228 0.00228 0.00219 0.00218 0.00228
[0.00089]*** [0.00088]*** [0.00088]*** [0.00089]** [0.00087]** [0.00088]***
n. children 6-13 0.0016919 0.00157 0.00155 0.00154 0.00168 0.00157
[0.00085]** [0.00085]* [0.00085]* [0.00086]* [0.00087]* [0.00085]*
n. elderly +66 -0.0094255 -0.00860 -0.00871 -0.00843 -0.00859 -0.00860
[0.00072]*** [0.00071]*** [0.00070]*** [0.00072]***[0.00071]***[0.00071]***
Controls yes yes no yes yes yes
State trends no yes no yes yes yes
Quarterly time effects no no yes no no no
Constant 1.10744 0.43052 0.45948 0.42690 0.42253 0.44150
[0.04275]*** [0.05002]*** [0.00181]*** [0.05069]***[0.05121]***[0.05064]***
Observations 3230194 3230194 3230194 3146463 3168847 3230194
Number of id_i 929364 929364 929364 906008 923643 929364
R-squared 0.0005 0.0008 0.00086 0.00076 0.00077 0.00077
1 Household level fixed effects (FE)
Controls include:  state trend, quarterly log GDP, quarterly inflation
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Column (2) will be the basic specification used in the reminding of the analysis36 
 
Table 6. Impact of Seguro Popular on Formality:
 Individual versus Household. Fixed Effects Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent  Variable SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS
Sample





HH  if HH is 
contributing. 







Children of HH 







SP -0.00608 -0.00296 -0.00443 -0.00708 -0.00352 -0.01534 0.00122 -0.00268 0.00894
[0.00105]*** [0.00110]*** [0.00119]*** [0.00169]*** [0.00133]*** [0.00184]*** [0.00136] [0.00225] [0.00332]***
SS head 0.03550 0.50681
[0024937]*** [0.04708]***
SP*SS head -0.00256 -0.02806
[0015046]** [0.00736]***
HH controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.27450 0.36861 0.22923 0.19499 0.22655 0.46580 -0.21307 0.15998 ‐0.02793
[0.04160]*** [0.05171]*** [0.04559]*** [0.07791]** [0.04598]*** [0.06221]*** [0.05776]*** [0.08191]* [0.05257]
Observations 6076859 3214851 2501360 1019940 2365615 2778521 667772 849414 2365429
Number of id_i 2098150 935480 723184 359412 689813 906720 250467 274580 689780
R-squared 0.00026 0.00051 0.00052 0.0008 0.0029 0.00094 0.0022 0.0004 0.001
Robust standard errors in clustered at the municipality level in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
HH controls include  number of children age 5 or younger, anumber of children ages 6-12, and number of adults older than 65












Table 7: Effects of SP on Transitions


















Inactivity (t) Unemployed 
(t)
SP 0.05341 0.04829 0.06671 0.08119 0.01033 0.08593
[0.00488]***[0.00765]***[0.00458]***[0.00789]***[0.00244]*** [0.00605]***
SS_covered 0.00137 -0.03883 -0.01242 -0.05060 0.10984 -0.00931
[0.00201] [0.00131]*** [0.00082]*** [0.00103]*** [0.00176]*** [0.00046]***
SS_covered*SP -0.00350 -0.00426 0.00598 0.01646 -0.01249 -0.00400
[0.00156]**[0.00119]***[0.00085]***[0.00080]***[0.00161]*** [0.00048]***
wage-employed with social security (t-1) -0.41444 -0.49790 -0.16099 -0.67201 0.00132
[0.00794]*** [0.00467]*** [0.00573]*** [0.00365]*** [0.00137]
SP*wage-employed with social security (t-1) -0.04354 -0.07182 -0.08064 -0.00594 -0.08889
[0.00686]***[0.00581]***[0.00829]*** [0.00331]* [0.00615]***
wage-employed without social security (t-1) -0.52258 -0.39516 -0.14022 -0.57772 0.00647
[0.00526]*** [0.00361]*** [0.00493]*** [0.00376]*** [0.00114]***
SP*wage-employed without social security (t-1) -0.08418 -0.07991 -0.08721 -0.01459 -0.08094
[0.00613]*** [0.00576]***[0.00808]***[0.00377]*** [0.00573]***
self-employed (t-1) -0.68054 -0.39553 -0.14970 -0.61109 -0.00178
[0.00485]*** [0.00745]*** [0.00526]*** [0.00295]*** [0.00131]
SP*self-employed (t-1) -0.05572 -0.03848 -0.07260 0.01313 -0.08514
[0.00544]***[0.00658]*** [0.00799]***[0.00229]*** [0.00588]***
Other informal employment (t-1) -0.69332 -0.41982 -0.39876 -0.48076 -0.00820
[0.00448]*** [0.00839]*** [0.00413]*** [0.00417]*** [0.00143]***
SP*Other informal employment (t-1) -0.03988 -0.03186 -0.04750 0.00848 -0.08567
[0.00469]***[0.00728]***[0.00530]*** [0.00431]* [0.00591]***
Inactivity (t-1) -0.65464 -0.42372 -0.43325 -0.15418 0.00011
[0.00395]*** [0.00783]*** [0.00319]*** [0.00482]*** [0.00128]
SP*Inactivity (t-1) -0.06474 -0.04993 -0.06729 -0.07879 -0.08072
[0.00490]***[0.00730]***[0.00486]***[0.00772]*** [0.00582]***
unemployed (t-1) -0.26860 -0.10345 -0.14093 -0.04636 -0.04371
[0.00692]*** [0.00582]*** [0.00389]*** [0.00314]*** [0.00542]***
SP*unemployed (t-1) -0.25642 -0.17483 -0.25960 -0.15486 -0.30345
[0.00976]***[0.00829]***[0.00909]***[0.00923]***[0.00904]***
HH controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.67001 0.54757 0.57131 0.43996 1.31916 0.16385
[0.04636]*** [0.06620]*** [0.03234]*** [0.03154]*** [0.05022]*** [0.02648]***
Observations 7005475 7005475 7005475 7005475 7005475 7005475
Number of id_i 0.56 0.24 0.37 0.08 0.54 0.02
R-squared
Controls include: state trend, quarterly log GDP, quarterly inflation
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%38 
 




controls Controls Constant [se] Obs.
N. of 
households R-sq.
(1) Male household head -0.00360 [0.00142]** yes yes 0.47213 [0.05752]*** 2506619 722459 0.0006
(2) Female household head -0.00378 [0.00284] yes yes 0.31452 [0.09884]*** 723575 209264 0.002
(3) HH with less than secondary completed -0.00541 [0.00163]*** yes yes 0.35269 [0.06181]*** 2186504 629494 0.0009
(4) HH with secondary completed or more  0.00204 [0.00180] yes yes 0.59307 [0.09127]*** 1043690 311432 0.0007
(5) Male HH with  less than secondary  -0.00486 [0.00179]*** yes yes 0.37516 [0.07118]*** 1661323 480085 0.0007
(6) Female HH with less than secondary -0.00721 [0.00324]** yes yes 0.28431 [0.11956]** 525181 150795 0.0023
(7) HH less than 30 years old 0.00039 [0.00248] yes yes 0.55318 [0.15428]*** 591366 203882 0.0008
(8) HH 30-49 years old -0.00586 [0.00179]*** yes yes 0.47311 [0.06594]*** 1818573 512787 0.0007
(9) HH 50 or more years old -0.00164 [0.00190] yes yes 0.31448 [0.07636]*** 820255 221431 0.0014
(10) Large Household -0.00363 [0.00143]** yes yes 0.43989 [0.05066]*** 2832985 673640 0.0008
(11) Small Household -0.00130 [0.00521] yes yes 0.24806 [0.23519] 397209 255724 0.0010
1 Household level
HH controls include: number of children 0-5 years old, number of children 6-13 years old, number of adults 66 or older
Controls include: state trend, quarterly log GDP, quarterly inflation
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets






























Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets
+ significant at 10.35%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
 Macro controls include: state trend, quarterly log GDP, quarterly inflation
Household head controls include: number of children 0-5 years old, number of children 6-13 
years old, number of adults 66 or older